The Bloomsbury Companion to Locke by S.-J. Savonius-Wroth

Author:S.-J. Savonius-Wroth
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9781472524164
Publisher: Bloomsbury Academic
Published: 2011-07-14T16:00:00+00:00

Innateness

Locke devotes Book I of the Essay to the question of innateness. Against a widely held view (Yolton, 1956), he argues both that there are no innate ‘speculative’ or epistemological principles and no ‘practical’ or moral principles, including the idea of God. The purpose of his critique is to advance an alternative thesis that knowledge is acquired through experience and the assembling of ideas, to advocate reason as a (providentially) adequate faculty for knowledge, and to support experimental natural philosophy which does not rely on internal principles or ‘maxims’. His position, especially on morals and the idea of God, generated enormous controversy.

In his discussion of speculative principles in Book I, chapter 2, Locke objects to the assumption that there are principles, characters or notions ‘stamped upon the Mind of Man’ and present in the soul from birth (E, I.ii.1, p. 48). While he refers to a literal or naïve view of innateness, he also addresses the dispositional account which asserts that these principles are assented to at a certain stage in human development (like the use of reason). Locke cites two examples of ostensibly innate maxims: Whatsoever is, is, and That it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not be. For Locke, these principles must receive universal assent from mankind to qualify as innate, but they fail to meet this condition. An imprinted truth must be perceived, according to Locke, but children and idiots do not assent to these statements, disproving their universality and the claim of innateness.

To those who modify the position by introducing the possession of reason as a dispositional requirement, Locke offers different answers depending on what is meant in this context: (1) if reason is necessary to discover innate truths, then everything discovered by reason must be described as innate. Locke rejects this as ‘a very improper way of speaking’ (E, I.ii.5, p. 50). (2) If by the use of reason is meant the moment at which assent is given, Locke does not detect circularity but rather suggests that the account is empirically false: in fact a long interval occurs between using reason and accepting or employing general propositions of this kind (as with children, illiterates or savages).

Locke maintains that innate truths must constitute a category clearly distinguishable from other truths or knowledge; by implication they should also be relatively limited or limitable in number. Accordingly, he concentrates on breaking down distinctions between ostensibly innate principles and other knowledge, and expanding their rank to such an extent that they are neither distinct nor economical. This strategy reappears in his reply to another proposed criterion of innateness – immediacy of assent. Locke indicates that on this basis the store of innate propositions would swell to include as many propositions as we have distinct ideas, together with every proposition of the form x is not y corresponding to all our stock of ideas – all of which receive immediate assent – but this would create ‘Legions’ of such propositions (E, I.ii17, p. 57).

Although compelling, Locke’s arguments are not decisive.

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